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Abstract. A new cryptographic protocol —ciphertext comparison—
can compare two ciphertexts without revealing the two encrypted mes-
sages. Correctness of the comparison can be publicly verified. This tech-
nique provides an efficient and publicly verifiable solution to the famous
millionaire problem. It is the first solution to the millionaire problem to
output a precise result (the two messages are equal or which is larger).
Privacy in this new solution is achieved with an overwhelmingly large
probability and strong enough in practice.
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1 Introduction
In the millionaire problem, two millionaires want to compare their richness with-
out revealing their wealth. This problem can be formulated as a comparison of
two ciphertexts without decrypting them. The millionaire problem is an inten-
sively studied problem in multiparty computation. Since this problem was raised
by Yao [24], many multiparty computation schemes [3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 16, 15, 20, 18,
19, 12, 4, 5, 23, 2, 22] have been proposed, each of which can be applied to the mil-
lionaire problem. However, none of the currently known multiparty computation
schemes provides an efficient and verifiable solution to the millionaire problem.
Moreover, all the existing solutions to the millionaire problem only output one
bit. So they output an imprecise result (whether a message is larger than the
other or no larger than the other), while a precise result should indicate a mes-
sage is larger than the other or equal to the other or smaller than the other. In
addition, many of the existing schemes have various other problems like lack of
verifiability.
A new protocol proposed in this paper, ciphertext comparison, can efficiently
implement comparison of two encrypted messages without revealing them. A
distributed homomorphic encryption algorithm is employed to encrypt the two
messages. The ciphertext comparison technique outputs a(m1 −m2) where a is
a random and secret integer. Parameter choice guarantees that a(m1−m2) indi-
cates the comparison result, but does not reveal any information about the two
messages with an overwhelmingly large probability except which one is larger.
The whole protocol is publicly verifiable. Correctness, privacy, robustness, public
verifiability and high efficiency are achieved simultaneously for the first time in
solving the millionaire problem. Moreover, a precise result is output in this new
solution.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the millionaire
problem and its previous solutions are recalled. In Section 3, new primitives
needed in this paper are proposed and proved to be secure. In Section 4, the
new ciphertext comparison protocol is described. In Section 5, the new ciphertext
comparison protocol is analysed and compared against previous solutions to the
millionaire problem. The paper is concluded in Section 6.
In the rest of this paper, the following symbols are used.
– || stands for concatenation.
– bxc is the largest integer no more than x.
– PKN(x1, x2, . . . , xn|cond) stands for the proof of knowledge of a set of in-
tegers x1, x2, . . . , xn satisfying a given condition cond.
2 The Millionaire Problem and Related Work
The millionaire problem was raised by Yao [24]. In the millionaire problem, two
millionaires want to compare who is richer without revealing their wealth. This
problem can be formulated as a comparison of two encrypted messages without
revealing them. Some participants (sometimes the two millionaires themselves)
are employed to solve the problem without revealing the two messages. The
following four properties are often desired in a solution protocol to the millionaire
problem.
– Correctness: If the two ciphertexts are decrypted and then compared, the
result is the same as the protocol outputs.
– Precision: A precise result must be output to indicate exactly which of the
three possibilities (whether a message is smaller than or equal to or larger
than the other) occurs.
– Public verifiability: Each participant can be publicly verified to honestly
follow the protocol.
– Privacy: After the computation, no information about the two messages is
revealed except the comparison result.
Although precision has never been addressed in the literature to our knowledge,
it is useful as usually a precise result is expected in any computation. Fischlin
[12] believed that verifiability is not compulsory as the participants have no
motivation to deviate from the protocol in some circumstances. It is argued in
[12] that at least the two millionaires may want to get the correct result and
so will strictly follow the protocol when acting as the participants. However,
the participants cannot be trusted no matter they are the millionaires or other
parties. For example, a millionaire in the role of a participant may deviate from
the protocol in order to get more information from the other millionaire. So,
verifiability (and often public verifiability) is necessary.
Solutions to the millionaire problem always employ multiparty computation.
In multiparty computation, multiple participants compute a function with en-
crypted inputs and determine the result of the function without revealing the
inputs. They usually employ an evaluation circuit consisting of some logic gates
to compute the function in ciphertext. Usually the decryption key of the em-
ployed encryption algorithm is shared among the participants, so that privacy
of the encrypted inputs can be protected with an assumption that the num-
ber of malicious participants is not over a threshold. In all the known existing
multiparty computation solutions [3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 16, 15, 20, 18, 19, 12, 4, 5, 23, 2,
22], only an imprecise result is output (a precise result should indicate one of
the three possible results). According to the computation in every gate in the
circuit, they can be divided into two methods. The first method is based on
encrypted truth tables. Namely, the rows in the truth table of each logic gate
in the circuit are encrypted and shuffled, so that any legal encrypted input to
each gate can be matched to an encrypted output without being revealed. The
second method is based on logic homomorphism of certain encryption schemes.
As special encryption algorithms homomorphic in regard to the logic gates in
the circuit are employed, the evaluation can be implemented by computing in
ciphertext without the help of any truth table.
The recent schemes employing the first method include [20], [19], [10], [18]
and [5]. In [20], a circuit is generated by an authority AI and sent to another
authority A, who uses it to process the ciphertext inputs. It is assumed that
these two parties do not collude. A hash function is employed in the truth tables
to link their inputs to their outputs. Correctness and verifiability are guaranteed
by a cut-and-choose mechanism. Oblivious transfer is employed by the input
providers to choose encrypted inputs from AI, so that privacy can be obtained
if the two autorities do not collude. As the oblivious transfer primitive employed
in [20] is not verifiable, AI can modify the inputs to the circuit without being
detected. This problem was fixed by Juels and Szydlo [19]. They design a prim-
itive called verifiable 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, which is slightly less efficient
than the 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer in [20], but prevents AI from cheating
alone. Other drawbacks of [20] are (1) the cut-and-choose mechanism to guaran-
tee circuit correctness is highly inefficient in communication as multiple circuits
must be transmitted from AI to A; (2) correctness of the comparison is not
publicly verifiable and relies on the trust that the two authorities do not col-
lude1; (3) the employed oblivious transfer is not efficient (either in computation
or communication).
1 Although it is said in [20] that “A naive verification procedure is to require the
auctioneer to publish the tables and garbled input values of the circuit (signed by
the AI), and allow suspecting bidders to simulate its computation”, this verification
procedure violates the basic rule in [20] that AI alone cannot know the bids. So
another verification method based on “signed ‘translation’ table” in [20] has to be
employed. Soundness of this verification method is based on an assumption that AI
does not reveal the ‘translation’ table to A.
In [10], [18] and [5], correctness of circuit and evaluation can be publicly
verified with the help of public-key cryptology. So cut-and-choose mechanism is
removed and correctness is not based on any trust. However, public-key cryptol-
ogy is much less efficient in computation than the hash function computation in
[20] and [19]. As the number of gates in a circuit is not small and construction,
evaluation and validity verification in each gate require hundreds of exponenti-
ations, an extremely high computational cost is needed in these schemes.
The recent schemes employing the second method include [23], [2], [12] and
[22]. The schemes in [23] and [12] employ a two-party technique called non-
interactive cryptocomputing, where the two input providers perform ciphertext
computation and result decryption respectively. In [23], NOT and OR gates are
used to construct the circuit while Goldwasser-Micali encryption or ElGamal
encryption are extended to be NOT and OR homomorphic to calculate NOT
and OR logic in ciphertext. In [12], NOT, XOR and AND gates are used to
construct the circuits while Goldwasser-Micali encryption (which is NOT and
XOR homomorphic) is extended to be AND homomorphic. The scheme in [23]
does not make good use of non-interactive cryptocomputing, is inefficient and
its privacy is dubious as the expression of its final result is dependent on the
inputs. The scheme in [12] overcomes these two drawbacks, provides satisfactory
privacy and is the most efficient known solution to the millionaire problem.
However, neither [23] nor [12] can provide a practical verification mechanism, so
they are not verifiable. Moreover, correctness is not absolute in [12]. Although
the probability that computation in any single gate in the circuit is incorrect is
small if a moderate value is chosen for a security parameter λ, large probability
correctness in any single gate does not necessarily guarantee large probability
correctness in the whole circuit. There are often many gates in the circuit and
the probability that computation in at least one gate is incorrect increases as
the number of AND gates increases. So when the two inputs are longer, λ must
be larger. The recommended value for λ in [12] (which is 40) may be not large
enough. As λ is linear in the cost of the scheme in [12], the scheme is not suitable
for the millionaire problem with long inputs.
The scheme in [2] is a multiparty generalized version of [23]. A multiparty
computation technique is specially designed in [22] to solve the millionaire prob-
lem. The evaluation circuit in [22] is composed of AND and OR gates. The secure
computation in [22] are supported by modified ElGamal encryption (modified
to be AND homomorphic) and zero test (a new technique to handle OR logic).
The protocol in [22] is publicly verifiable, but not efficient enough.
So far, there is not any correct, precise, private, verifiable and efficient so-
lution to the millionaire problem. Such a solution will be designed in this pa-
per. The new technique is called ciphertext comparison. It employs the second
method, but in a novel manner.
3 Preliminary Work
Three cryptographic primitives are presented in this section and will be applied
to the new ciphertext comparison protocol. All multiplications in this section
are with a modulus N2 where N is the Paillier composite [21].
3.1 Proof of Knowledge of N th Root modZ∗N2
Proof of knowledge of root was proposed by Guillou and Quisquater [17], in which
an honest verifier ZK proof of knowledge of vth root with a composite modulus
n was presented and proved to be secure. A variation of the proof protocol of
knowledge of root in [17] is described here. In the protocol in Figure 1, a specific
setting is employed: knowledge of N th root modulo N2 must be proved where
N is a Paillier composite. The protocol is used to prove the knowledge of x,
the N th root of y and an integer in Z∗N2 , where P and V stand for prover and
verifier. This proof protocol is consistent with the Paillier setting and can be
applied to verify the validity of Paillier encryption. Correctness of this protocol
is straightforward. Namely, when the prover knows a N th root of y, he can pass
the verification. Since the setting is different from the original protocol in [17],
it must be proved that the new protocol is sound with Paillier setting.
P → V : b = rN where r is randomly chosen from ZN .
V → P : e, where |e| = 160.
P → V : w = rxe
Verification: wN = bye
Fig. 1. Proof of Knowledge of N th Root
Theorem 1. The proof protocol of knowledge of N th root in Figure 1 is specially
sound if N is correctly generated. More precisely, if the prover can provide correct
responses to two different challenges with a same commitment, he can calculate
a N th root of y efficiently.
Proof: If the prover can provide responses w1 and w2 to a commitment b and
two different challenges e1 and e2 where e1 > e2, such that
wN1 = by
e1 (1)
wN2 = by
e2 (2)
then (1) divided by (2) yields
(w1/w2)N = ye1−e2
According to the Euclidean algorithm, integers α and β can be found, such
that β(e1 − e2) = αN + gcd(N, e1 − e2). As N = pq is correctly generated, p
and q are primes and the length of p and q is much longer than |e1 − e2|, so
gcd(N, e1 − e2) = 1. So
(w1/w2)βN = yβ(e1−e2) = yαN+1
Namely,
y = ((w1/w2)β/yα)N
So, (w1/w2)β/yα is a N th root of y. Note that the prover can calculate α and β
efficiently from N and e1 − e2 using Euclidean algorithm. Therefore, the prover
can get a N th root of y efficiently. 2
Theorem 2. The proof protocol of knowledge of N th root in Figure 1 is honest
verifier zero knowledge.
Proof: A simulator with no knowledge of any N th root of y can choose e and w
randomly from {0, 1}160 and Z∗N2 respectively and calculate b = wN/ye. Thus a
simulated transcript composed of b, e and w is obtained where e, w, b are uni-
formly distributed in {0, 1}160, Z∗N2 , Z∗N2 respectively and wN = bye. The proof
transcript generated by a prover with knowledge of an N th root of y and an
honest verifier (who chooses the challenge randomly and independently) is also
composed of e, w, b uniformly distributed in {0, 1}160, Z∗N2 , Z∗N2 respectively
and satisfying wN = bye. So these two proof transcripts are indistinguishable. 2
According to Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, this proof protocol is a so-called
Σ-protocol [11]. So according to Damgard’s analysis in [11], this proof is sound
(the probability that a prover without the knowledge of a N th root of y can
pass the verification in this protocol is no more than 2−160) and private (the
prover’s knowledge of N th root of y is not revealed). Hash function H() can be
employed to generate the challenge as e = H(y||b), so that the protocol becomes
non-interactive. In the rest of this paper, non-interactive proof of knowledge
of N th root is applied. If H() can be seen as a random oracle, security is not
compromised in the non-interactive proof.
3.2 Proof of Knowledge of 1-out-of-2 N th Root modZ∗N2
The proof protocol in Figure 2 is a combination of the proof of N th root in
Figure 1 and the proof of partial knowledge [8] to prove the knowledge of x, the
N th root of y1 or y2, integers in Z∗N2 . For simplicity, it is supposed without losing
generality xN = y2. Correctness of this protocol is straightforward. Namely, when
the prover knows a N th root of either y1 or y2, he can pass the verification. As the
proof of knowledge of N th root modulo N2 in Section 3.1 and the partial proof
technique in [8] are both specially sound and honest verifier ZK, this protocol
is also specially sound and honest verifier ZK. Namely, the probability that a
prover without the knowledge of a N th root of y1 or y2 can pass the verification
in this protocol is no more than 2−160 the prover’s knowledge of N th root of y1
or y2 is not revealed. Moreover, this protocol can also be extended to be non-
interactive without compromising its security when a hash function regarded as
a random oracle is used to generate the challenge e.
1. The prover chooses r, w1 and e1 randomly from Z
∗
N , Z
∗
N2 and {0, 1}160
respectively. He calculates b1 = w
N
1 y
e1
1 and b2 = r
N .
2. The verifier randomly chooses a 160-bit challenge e.
3. The prover calculates e2 = e− e1 and w2 = r/xe2 .
4. The prover publishes e1, w1, e2 and w2. Anybody can verify e = e1+ e2
and b1 = w
N
1 y
e1
1 and b2 = w
N
2 y
e2
2 .
Fig. 2. Proof of Knowledge of 1-out-of-2 N th Root
3.3 A Combined Proof of Equality of Exponents and Knowledge of
N th Root
1. The prover chooses v ∈ ZN , u1 ∈ Z∗N and n2 ∈ Z∗N randomly and
calculates γ = gv1u
N
1 and θ = g
v
2u
N
2 . He sends γ and θ to the verifier.
2. The verifier randomly chooses a 160-bit challenge e and sends it to the
prover.
3. The prover calculates z1 = v − ex, z2 = u1/re1, z3 = u2/re2 and sends
them to the verifier.
4. The verifier verifies γ = gz11 z
N
2 y
e
1 and θ = g
z1
2 z
N
3 y
e
2. He accepts the proof
only if these two equations are correct.
Fig. 3. Combined Proof of Equality of Exponent and Knowledge of N th Root
Let g1, g2, y1 and y2 be in Z∗N2 . The proof protocol in Figure 3 is used to prove
PKN(x, r1, r2 | x ∈ Z, r1 ∈ Z∗N , r2 ∈ Z∗N , y1 = gx1 rN1 , y2 = gx2 rN2 ). Correctness
of this protocol is straightforward. Namely, if the prover knows x, r1, r2 and
follows the protocol, the verifier will accept his proof. Soundness of this protocol
seems at first to be straightforward if it is regarded as a combination of proof
of equality of logarithms in Appendix A and proof of knowledge of N th root in
Section 3.1, both of which are sound. However, in this protocol, g1 and g2 may
be in two different cyclic groups with different orders. As the proof of equality
of logarithms in Appendix A can only be applied to prove equality of logarithms
in a same group or two groups with a same order, it cannot be applied here. To
the authors’ knowledge, the only technique to prove equality of logarithms in
groups with different orders was proposed by Bao [1]. However, his technique is
only sound (passing his verification guarantee two logarithms in different groups
with different orders are equal with a very large probability) but not correct
(lots of equal logarithm pairs in the two groups cannot pass the verification
with a very large probability)2 so can only be applied to his special application
— a verifiable encryption scheme. As our protocol must be both correct and
sound, our technique is different from his in that equality of exponents instead
of equality of logarithms is proved. Namely, it is not required in our scheme
that the two exponents are equal with two different moduluses. It is enough that
the two exponents are equal without any modulus. Soundness of our protocol is
proved in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. The proof protocol in Figure 3 is specially sound. More precisely,
if the prover can provide correct responses for two different challenges to a same
commitment, he can efficiently calculate x, r1 and r2, such that x ∈ Z, r1 ∈ Z∗N ,
r2 ∈ Z∗N , y1 = gx1 rN1 , y2 = gx2 rN2 if N is correctly generated.
Proof: If the prover can provide two sets of responses z1,1, z2,1, z3,1 and z1,2,
z2,2, z3,2 for two different challenges e1 and e2 and the same commitment pair
γ, θ, such that
γ = gz1,11 z
N
2,1y
e1
1 (3)
θ = gz1,12 z
N
3,1y
e1
2 (4)
γ = gz1,21 z
N
2,2y
e2
1 (5)
θ = gz1,22 z
N
3,2y
e2
2 (6)
then
(3), (5)⇒ gz1,11 zN2,1ye11 = gz1,21 zN2,2ye21
So,
g
z1,1−z1,2
1 (z2,1/z2,2)
N = ye2−e11
Similarly, because of (4) and (6),
g
z1,1−z1,2
2 (z3,1/z3,2)
N = ye2−e12
According to the Euclidean algorithm, integers α and β can be found, such that
β(e1 − e2) = αN + gcd(N, e1 − e2). So
g
β(z1,1−z1,2)
1 (z2,1/z2,2)
βN = yαN+gcd(N,e1−e2)1
2 In [1], a boundary check is used to guarantee the secret the prover uses in his response
is very small to guarantee soundness. As the boundary check is too strict, his proof is
only sound but not correct. Actually, it is impossible to find an efficient and accurate
boundary check, which must be able to efficiently ensure that the secret can be any
integer smaller than the modulus of the larger group. For example, correctness can
be achieved by using quite loose boundary check, which compromises soundness.
and
g
β(z1,1−z1,2)
2 (z3,1/z3,2)
βN = yαN+gcd(N,e1−e2)2
As N = pq and the p and q are primes with length much longer than |e1 − e2|
(N is a correctly generated Paillier composite), gcd(N, e1 − e2) = 1. So,
g
β(z1,1−z1,2)
1 ((z2,1/z2,2)
β/yα1 )
N = y1 (7)
and
g
β(z1,1−z1,2)
2 ((z3,1/z3,2)
β/yα2 )
N = y2 (8)
Note that the prover can efficiently calculate α and β easily from N and e1− e2
using Euclidean algorithm. Therefore, the prover can get x = β(z1,1 − z1,2),
r1 = (z2,1/z2,2)β/yα1 and r2 = (z3,1/z3,2)
β/yα2 efficiently, such that x ∈ Z,
r1 ∈ Z∗N , r2 ∈ Z∗N , y1 = gx1 rN1 , y2 = gx2 rN2 . 2
Theorem 4. The proof protocol in Figure 3 is honest verifier zero knowledge.
This theorem can be proved like Theorem 2.
According to Theorem 3 and Theorem 4, the proof protocol in Figure 3 is
sound (the probability that a prover without the required knowledge can pass
the verification in this protocol is no more than 2−160) and private (the prover’s
secret knowledge is not revealed). A hash function H() can be employed to
generate the challenge as e = H(y1||y2||γ||θ), so that the protocol becomes non-
interactive. In the rest of this paper, the non-interactive version of this proof
is applied. If H() can be seen as a random oracle, security is not compromised
in the non-interactive proof. Note that this protocol does not guarantee the
secret knowledge x is smaller than order(g1) or order(g2). That is why we say
that equality of exponents instead of equality of logarithms is included in this
protocol.
4 Ciphertext Comparison
Suppose two L-bit messagesm1 andm2 encrypted in c1 and c2 respectively are to
be compared. The main idea of the comparison is comparing F (m1) and F (m2)
where F () is a monotonely increasing one-way function. Based on this idea, a
comparison technique Com(c1, c2) can be designed, such that Com(c1, c2) = 1
if m1 > m2; Com(c1, c2) = 0 if m1 = m2; Com(c1, c2) = −1 if m1 < m2. The
comparison procedure is as follows.
1. An additive homomorphic encryption algorithm with encryption function
E() is employed, such that E(x1 + x2) = E(x1)E(x2) and E(ax) = E(x)a
for any messages x, x1, x2 and factor a. The public key is published while
the private key is shared by participants A1, A2, . . . , Am. The message space
of the encryption algorithm is {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, where 2L+mL′ < bN/2c and
L′ is a security parameter.
2. mi is encrypted into ci = E(mi) for i = 1, 2. It is proved that ci is an
encryption of a message with L bits without revealing the message for i =
1, 2.
3. Each Al chooses al so that al ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2L′ − 1} and calculates c′l = c′all−1
for i = 1, 2 where c′0 = c1/c2. Al proves logc′
l−1
c′l < 2
L′ without revealing al
for l = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
4. The authorities cooperate to decrypt c′m.
Com(c1, c2) =
1 if 0 < D(c
′
m) ≤ bN/2c
0 if D(c′m) = 0
−1 if D(c′m) > bN/2c
(9)
Any distributed additive homomorphic encryption algorithm can be em-
ployed in this ciphertext comparison. In this section, the ciphertext comparison
protocol is described in detail based on distributed Paillier (see Appendix B).
4.1 Bit Encryption and its Validity Verification
Messages m1 and m2 must be encrypted in a special way such that it is publicly
verifiable from their encryptions that they are in the range {0, 1, . . . , 2L−1}. So
the following encryption-by-bit method is employed.
– Paillier encryption with distributed decryption (see Appendix B) is employed
such that the parameters N , m, L′ and L satisfy 2L+mL
′
< (N −1)/2 where
m is the number of participants and N is the Paillier composite.
– Binary representation of mi is a vector (mi,1,mi,2, . . . ,mi,L) for i = 1, 2
where mi,j ∈ {0, 1} and mi =
∑L
j=1mi,j2
j−1.
– Component mi,j is encrypted with Paillier encryption to ci,j = gmi,jrNi,j mod
N2 for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2, . . . , L where ri,j is randomly chosen from Z∗N .
– The encrypted vectors (ci,1, ci,2, . . . , ci,L) for i = 1, 2 are published.
– The encryptor (millionaire or more generally message provider) proves that
each ci,j is an encryption of 0 or 1 by providing a proof of knowledge of c
1/N
i,j
or (ci,j/g)1/N for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2, . . . , L. Proof of knowledge of 1-out-
of-2 N th root in the Paillier setting described in Section 3.2 is employed in
the proof.
– Anybody can verify validity of ci,j for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2, . . . , L.
If the verification is passed, two ciphertexts ci =
∏L
j=1 c
2j−1
i,j mod N
2 =
g
∑L
j=1
mi,j2
j−1
rNi mod N
2 = gmirNi mod N
2 for i = 1, 2 are formed for com-
parison where ri =
∏L
j=1 r
2j−1
i,j mod N .
Only if the two ciphertexts are verified to be L bits long, can they be compared.
4.2 The Comparison Function
The authorities A1, A2, . . . , Am compare c1 = gm1rN1 mod N
2 and c2 =
gm2rN2 mod N
2 and validity of the comparison can be publicly verified.
1. al is selected randomly from {0, 1, . . . , 2L′−1} while its validity is guaranteed
by bit encryption and its validity verification.
(a) Al chooses al randomly from {0, 1, . . . , 2L′ − 1} with binary representa-
tion
(al,1, al,2, . . . , al,L′) where al =
∑L′
j=1 al,j2
j−1. He keeps them secret and
publishes dl,j = gal,j tNl,j mod N
2 for j = 1, 2, . . . , L′ where tl,j is ran-
domly chosen from Z∗N .
(b) Al proves that each dl,j contains 0 or 1 by providing a proof of knowledge
of N th root of either dl,j or dl,j/g modulus N2 as proposed in Section 3.2.
(c) Anybody can verify the validity of dl,j for j = 1, 2, . . . , L′ and calculates
dl =
∏L′
j=1 d
2j−1
l,j mod N
2, which is a commitment of al.
Only if dl for l = 1, 2, . . . ,m are verified to be valid, the comparison contin-
ues.
2. Each Al performs c′l = c
′al
l−1s
N
l mod N
2 for l = 1, 2, . . . ,m where c′0 =
c1/c2 mod N2 and sl is randomly chosen from Z∗N . Al has to give a proof
PKN(al, tl, sl | al ∈ Z, tl ∈ Z∗N , sl ∈ Z∗N , dl = galtN1 mod N2, c′l = c′all−1sNl mod N2)
(10)
where tl =
∏L′
j=1 t
2j−1
l,j mod N . This proof can be implemented using the
combined proof of equality of exponent and knowledge of N th root proposed
in Section 3.3 and is called monotone proof. Only if the verification is passed,
the comparison continues.
3. The authorities corporately compute Com(c1, c2) by decrypting c′m.
4. Result of comparison
Com(c1, c2) =
1 if 0 < D(c
′
m) ≤ (N − 1)/2
0 if D(c′m) = 0
−1 if D(c′m) > (N − 1)/2
(11)
5 Analysis
The ciphertext comparison technique is analysed and compared against the pre-
vious solutions to millionaire problem in this section.
5.1 Security and Efficiency Analysis
Theorem 5. The proposed ciphertext comparison protocol is correct and sound.
More precisely, assume it is infeasible for any Al to find s and t, such
that t 6= 1 mod N and gstN = 1 mod N2, then iff m1 < m2 < 2L,
Com(E(m1), E(m2)) = −1; iff m1 = m2 < 2L, Com(E(m1), E(m2)) = 0;
iff m2 < m1 < 2L, Com(E(m1), E(m2)) = 1.
Proof: As the combined proof of equality of exponents and knowledge of N th
root in Section 3.3 is sound, monotone proof (Formula (10)) guarantees that Al
knows a′l, t
′
l and sl such that a
′
l ∈ Z, t′l ∈ Z∗N , sl ∈ Z∗N , dl = ga
′
lt′N1 mod N
2 and
c′l = c
′a′l
l−1s
N
l mod N
2. As Paillier encryption algorithm is additive homomorphic,
D(c′m) = D((c1/c2)
∏m
l=1
a′l) = D(c
∏m
l=1
a′l
1 /c
∏m
l=1
a′l
2 ) = D(c
∏m
l=1
a′l
1 )−D(c
∏m
l=1
a′l
2 ) mod N
= D((gm1rN1 )
∏m
l=1
a′l)−D((gm2rN2 )
∏m
l=1
a′l) mod N
= D(gm1
∏m
l=1
a′l(r
∏m
l=1
a′l
1 )
N )−D(gm2
∏m
l=1
a′l(r
∏m
l=1
a′l
2 )
N ) mod N
In Section 4.1, validity of dl,j for j = 1, 2, . . . , L′ is proved by Al using the
proof of knowledge of 1-out-of-2 N th root proposed in Section 3.2. As the proof
of knowledge of 1-out-of-2 N th root is sound, it is guaranteed that Al knows
al,j and tl,j for j = 1, 2, . . . , L′, such that tl,j ∈ Z∗N , al,j ∈ {0, 1} and dl,j =
gal,j tNl,j mod N
2. As dl =
∏L′
j=1 d
2j−1
l,j mod N
2, Al knows al =
∑L′
j=1 al,j2
j−1
and tl =
∏L′
j=1 t
2j−1
l,j mod N , such that tl ∈ Z∗N , al < 2L
′
and dl = galtNl mod
N2. Therefore, ga
′
lt′N1 = g
altNl mod N
2. Namely, ga
′
l−al(t′l/tl)
N = 1 mod N2.
As a result, t′l = tl mod N , otherwise Al can find t
′
l/tl and a
′
l − al, such that
t′l/tl 6= 1 mod N and ga
′
l−al(t′l/tl)
N = 1 mod N2, which is contradictory to the
assumption that it is infeasible to find s and t, such that t 6= 1 mod N and
gstN = 1 without knowledge of factorization of N . So al = a′l mod order(g).
Therefore,
D(c′m) = D(g
m1
∏m
l=1
al(r
∏m
l=1
al
1 )
N )−D(gm2
∏m
l=1
al(r
∏m
l=1
al
2 )
N ) mod N
= D(E(m1
∏m
l=1 al))−D(E(m2
∏m
l=1 al)) mod N = m1
∏m
l=1 al −m2
∏m
l=1 al mod N
Since it has been publicly verified that 2L+mL
′
< (N − 1)/2, mi ∈
{0, 1, . . . , 2L − 1} and al ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2L − 1} for l = 1, 2, . . . ,m, function
F (mi) = mi
∏m
l=1 al is monotonely increasing and smaller than bN − 1c/2.
Therefore, if m1,m2 < 2L,
D(c′m)
∈ (0, (N − 1)/2] iff m1 > m2= 0 iff m1 = m2
> (N − 1)/2 iff m1 < m2
(12)
2
The assumption that it is infeasible for Al to find s and r, such that r 6=
1 mod N and gsrN = 1 mod N2 without knowledge of factorization of N is
correct because it seems reasonable to assume that given a constant z it is
infeasible to find x and y, such that f1(x)f2(y) = z where f1() and f2() are
one-way functions. As factorization of N is kept secret to any single authority,
both f1(x) = gx mod N2 and f2(y) = yN mod N2 are one-way functions to Al.
Moreover, if this assumption is incorrect, any Paillier ciphertext can be decrypted
into multiple different messages, which is contradictory to the wide belief that
Paillier encryption is secure. Therefore, this assumption is reliable.
The encryption verification in Section 4.1 is private as illustrated in Sec-
tion 3.2. Privacy of the comparison in Section 4.2 is analysed as follows. If Al
does not reveal al, it is computationally infeasible for any other party to get any
information about al from dl as Paillier encryption is secure when the number
of dishonest authorities is not over the threshold. Validity proof of dl is private
as it is a proof of knowledge of 1-out-of-2 N th root proposed in Section 3.2.
Monotone proof (Formula 10) is private as it is a combined proof of knowledge
of 1-out-of-2 N th root and equality of exponents proposed in Section 3.3. So al is
not revealed in these two proofs. So m1−m2 is not revealed from D(c′m), which
is equal to
∏m
l=1 al(m1 −m2) mod N . Therefore, none of m1, m2 or m1 −m2
are revealed. However, when D(c′m) is too near to the boundaries of its value
domain (in (0, 2L), (N−2L, N), (2mL′ , 2L+mL′) or (N−2L+mL′ , N−2mL′)) par-
tial information is revealed from m1−m2. The revelation of partial information
is demonstrated in Table 1. An example is given in Table 1, where N is 1024
bits long (according to the widely accepted security standard) and L = 40 (large
enough for practical applications). As illustrated in Table 1, D(c′m) is usually far
away from the boundaries and is in the four special ranges with an overwhelm-
ingly small probability. So, the ciphertext comparison protocol is private with
an overwhelmingly large probability. Therefore, the whole ciphertext comparison
protocol is private with an overwhelmingly large probability.
Table 1. Partial information revelation from m1 −m2
Phenomenon Revelation Probability
value example
Case 1 D(c′m) ∈ (0, 2L) m1 −m2 ∈ (0, D(c′m)] 2L/N 2−984
Case 2 D(c′m) ∈ (N − 2L, N) m2 −m1 ∈ (0, D(c′m)] 2L/N 2−984
Case 3 D(c′m) ∈ (2mL
′
, 2L+mL
′
) m1 −m2 ∈ [D(c′m)/2mL
′
, 2L) 2L/N 2−984
Case 4 D(c′m) ∈ (N − 2L+mL
′
, N − 2mL′) m2 −m1 ∈ [D(c′m)/2mL
′
, 2L) 2L/N 2−984
Totally 2L+2/N 2−982
As the encryption verification in Section 4.1 is a proof of knowledge of 1-out-
of-2 N th root proposed in Section 3.2, it is sound, namely a ciphertext containing
an invalid message can pass the verification with a negligible probability. So
the ciphertext comparison protocol is robust. As each step in the ciphertext
comparison protocol is publicly verifiable, public verifiability is achieved. As no
complex circuit is used, the ciphertext comparison scheme is quite efficient.
5.2 Comparison
A comparison between the new solution to the millionaire problem and the ex-
isting solutions is provided in Table 2, where the modular multiplications are
counted in regard to computation and transportation of integers with signifi-
cant length (e.g. 1024 bits long) is counted in regard to communication. The
schemes in [10] and [2] are similar to [18] and [23] respectively, so are not anal-
ysed separately. K is the full-length of exponent, t is the cutting factor in the
cut-and-choose mechanism in [20] and [19], λ is a parameter in [12] and T is a
parameter in [22]. An example is used in Table 2, where fair values are chosen for
the parameters: |N | = 1024, K = 1024, m = 3, L = 100, L′ = 10, t = 40, λ = 40
and T = 20. According to this comparison, the proposed ciphertext comparison
technique is the only efficient, publicly verifiable, private and precise solution to
millionaire problem.
Table 2. Property comparison
Public Precise Computation Communication
verifiability result cost example cost example
[20] No No ≥ 15KLt ≥ 40960000 ≥ 37Lt + 2t ≥ 148080
[19] Yes No ≥ 15KLt ≥ 40960000 ≥ 37Lt + 2t ≥ 148080
[18] Yes No average 4665KL + 6 477696006 average 1626L + 6 162606
[5] Yes No average ≥ 4039.5KL ≥ 413644800 ≥ 1543L ≥ 154300
[23] No No > L4 > 100000000 ≥ 343L3 ≥ 343000000
[12] No No (1.5λL(L + 3)) + (λ + 1)L(L + 1))/2 516050 L(λ + 2) 4200
[22] Yes No (L + 2)(L − 1)(1 + 0.5T ) + 37.5KL 4052058 25L 2500
Proposed Yes Yes 1.5K(5mL′ + 8m + 10L) 1803264 5mL′ + 4m + 10L 1162
6 Conclusion
A new cryptographic technique —ciphertext comparison— is proposed to com-
pare two ciphertexts and determine which contains a larger message. This new
technique is the only efficient and publicly verifiable solution to the millionaire
problem. It is also the only precise solution to the millionaire problem. In the
new scheme privacy of the two messages is protected with an overwhelmingly
large probability.
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A Proof of Equality of Logarithms
Suppose G is a cyclic group of order µ modulo ν. g1, g2 are two generators of
G. Y1 = gx1 and Y2 = g
x
2 while x ∈ Zµ. Below is a protocol to prove logg1 Y1 =
logg2 Y2 without revealing x.
1. The prover chooses randomly r ∈ Zµ and calculates a = gr1 mod ν and
b = gr2 mod ν.
2. Then he calculates c = H(a||b||Y1||Y2||g1||g2) while H is a collision-resistant
hash function H: (0, 1)∗ → Zµ.
3. The prover calculates s = r − cx mod µ.
4. Anyone can verify c = H(gs1Y
c
1 ||gs2Y c2 mod ν||Y1||Y2||g1||g2 mod ν). The
proof is accepted only when this verification is passed.
B Distributed Paillier’s Algorithm
Fouque et al [13] presented a distributed version of Paillier’s encryption scheme
[21] as a building block in their voting scheme. Let us recall the protocol.
1. Key generation:
N = pq is the RSA modulus where p = 2p´ + 1 and q = 2q´ + 1 are strong
primes and gcd(N,ϕ(N)) = 1. The length of N is 1024 bit where |p| = |q|.
An integer g is chosen such that its order is a multiple of N modulo N2 (In
this paper, it is required that order(g) > 2N). Public key consists of N and
g while the private key is λ(N), which is shared among n participants. Let
F (x) =
∑t
κ=0 fκx
r where f0 = λ(N) and f1, f2, . . . , ft are random values.
di = F (i) is distributed to Pi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. v is a square that generates
the cyclic subgroup of squares in Z∗N2 . Let 4 = n!. The verification keys
vi = v4di for i = 1, 2, . . . , n are published where ui =
∏
1≤j≤n,j 6=i
j
j−i .
2. Encryption:
A message s ∈ ZN is encrypted to c = gsrN mod N2 where r is randomly
chosen from ZN (with a very large probability r ∈ Z∗N ).
3. Distributed decryption:
For i = 1, 2, . . . , n, Pi provides his share of decryption si = c24di and proves
non-interactively logc44 s2i = logv∆ vi using proof of equality of logarithms
proposed in Appendix A.
4. Combination:
s = L(
∏
i∈S s
24ui
i )× 1442ζ where ui =
∏
1≤j≤n,j 6=i
j
j−i .
